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T here are several reasons for the increasing role of Muslims in contemporary Russia, but those who study the area might conclude that a major, 
if not the major reason is their growing numbers. It is 
well known that Russia's population has decreased, but 
the decline has mostly affected ethnic Russians. Ethnic 
minorities in the Russian Federation who have histori- 
cally professed Islam have experienced high birthrates, 
and consequently, the increasing interest of Muslims in 
the Federation. But this growth can hardly explain the 
growing Muslim population and, especially, their con- 
flict with ethnic Russians, historically Orthodox. The 
source of the rising numbers of Russian Muslims--of 
various ethnic groups--is the dramatic decline of the 
global role of Russians, in fact, of the entire Slavic 
civilization as it has been constructed geopolitically 
and culturally for centuries. 
To start with, the increasing number of people whose 
parents or grandparents were Muslim does not in itself 
create political/ethnic problems. The fact that certain 
ethnic groups in the former USSR were Muslim in the 
past does not necessitate that these people should be 
Muslims in the present, or that they should use their 
particular cultures and languages to emphasize their dif- 
ferences from the majority so as to create problems for 
the majority and the state in general. These people could 
well have been assimilated, as was done in the Soviet 
period, when most people--including those historically 
Muslim--had no religious affiliation and their Soviet 
passports retained the clause "nationality-ethnicity." 
Indeed, the historically Muslim minorities of the 
USSR followed the same road as other minorities. 
Many ethnic minorities were almost totally assimi-
lated. They had no knowledge or interest in their native 
language/culture, and they often downplayed their 
differences from Russians. This was not the result of 
an intentional assimilation policy of the authorities, 
despite the assertions of nationalist-minded intel-
lectuals from these minorities as well as quite a few 
Western pundits. 
It is true that Soviet authorities inhibited the spread 
of religion; whereas they were comparatively tolerant 
of Orthodoxy, especially in the last years of the Soviet 
regime, they had much more negative views toward 
other religions. The prime targets were not Muslims 
but Jews and various Protestant sects, mostly because 
of the implicit connection between them and the USA, 
the major political rival of the USSR. Judaism also cre- 
ated an additional problem, for it stimulated Russian 
Jews' nationalism and desire for emigration to Israel. 
In contrast to the tsarists, the Soviet authorities did not 
directly punish or suppress studying or speaking one's 
native non-Russian language; at least the exceptions 
were quite rare. This was also the case with most non- 
Russian cultures/histories. 
Of course, there was censorship, along with subjects 
that were not studied at all or only from a particular 
angle approved by the authorities. But the same prob- 
lems existed for Russians and Russian culture during 
the Soviet period; in fact, no intellectual/cultural 
pursuit in the USSR could avoid the supervision and 
direct/indirect restraints of the Party/authorities. Thus, 
the restraints on the study of the historical/cultural 
traditions of the minorities of the USSR, including 
those who traditionally had been Muslims, did not 
mean serious pressure that would preclude them from 
studying their native culture/language. Moreover, the 
Soviet state, with its dominant Russian culture, actually 
promoted minorities' languages and cultures and often 
supported the native elite to prevent assimilation. In 
some non-Russian republics, local authorities forced 
high school students to take courses in non-Russian 
languages/culture even when neither the students nor 
their parents had any desire to do so. 
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The decline of interest in the culture and language 
of minorities, including those who were traditionally 
Muslim, could not therefore be attributed to the direct 
pressure of the central government. The lack of inter- 
est in studying non-Russian languages/cultures was 
also not entirely due to assimilation caused by the fact 
that Russian was the lingua franca of the state. The 
deeper reason had to do with the relationship between 
culture/language and power. 
Such problems of the relations between power and 
culture have been explored by French postmodemists 
and later by their American followers for a long time. 
The proponents of the theory usually asserted that those 
who control "discourse"--ideology/culture--control 
power. But the opposite is true: it is those who con-
trol power, or, in a broad sense, civilizations, and are 
viewed as being mighty, who usually attract interest. 
The culture/language of these civilizations is seen as 
attractive and eagerly imitated. There is also a strong 
desire to be assimilated by these civilizations. This 
explains why ethnic minorities of the former USSR, 
including those who were historically Muslim, not 
only demonstrated a lack of interest in Islam--this, 
indeed, was discouraged, as was any religion--but also 
assimilated at a rapid pace. They quickly transformed 
themselves into basically Russian-speaking/Russian- 
by-culture individuals. 
The Soviet Union, regardless of philosophical/politi- 
cal explanations of the regime, was the direct descen- 
dant of the Russian empire and thus was the empire of 
ethnic Russians par excellence. It was a dynamic global 
state with enormous prestige, and was projected to be so 
in the future even at the time of Brezhnev's stagnation. 
The USSR/Russia was a part of the great Slavic com- 
monwealth. Russian civilization had what was called 
the Russian idea--the sense of a global mission and 
destiny to create an ideal society. In its cosmological 
interpretation, the "Russian idea" implied Russia's 
leading role in spreading humanity in the cosmos. 
These grand schemes implied a certain image of 
ideal Russian men and women as highly spiritualized, 
heroic people who lived for high goals and were ready 
for sacrifice. All these aspects of Russian civilization 
had disappeared by the time of the collapse of the 
USSR. By 1991, Russia had become a second-rate 
power, and even the improvement during Putin's ten- 
ure has not dramatically changed the situation. Even 
in the best case scenario, Russia will never be a major 
global center, the role it played in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries and especially during the postwar 
Soviet era. Corruption and crass materialism also al- 
most completely eradicated the Russian man or woman 
as a role model. 
While Russia is in the process of geopolitical decay 
and there are serious problems for the very existence 
of its civilization, the situation with the Muslim com- 
munity of the various ethnic groups in the Russian 
Federation is much different. It was able to withstand 
the shock-wave of changes much better, and at the 
present has felt the rising assertiveness of the global 
Muslim community. All this has led not to increasing 
assimilation but to the opposite. Ethnic minorities 
who had a weak sense of national/religious identity in 
the Soviet period have solidified a sense of separate 
identity that in many ways became opposite to that of 
the Russians. 
These new trends have led to several new models of 
relationships between Russians and Muslim minorities 
in the Federation. And they have also led to possible 
tensions between ethnic Russians and Muslim minori- 
ties, with serious implications for the Russian state and 
also--due to Russia's still enormous size--for all of 
Eurasia. 
Muslim Programs in Dealing with the Russians 
Muslims have included various ethnic groups, and 
it is not accidental that the resurrection of interest in 
Islam has often merged with rising ethnic nationalism, 
with a program of either complete independence from 
Moscow or at least, minimization of the groups' (e.g., 
Tatars) dependence on Moscow. The ideology of these 
groups requires special study; our work is focused on 
another set of groups and ideologies. 
The proponents of these ideologies do not spread the 
idea of nationality/ethnicity or of the dissolution of the 
Russian Federation. In fact, they vehemently discard 
nationalism as a dangerous idea that could just separate 
Muslims from each other. It is not race/ethnicity but 
common beliefs that unite or separate people. In a way, 
these Muslims anathematize nationalism in the same 
way as did orthodox Marxists, who proclaimed that the 
"proletariat has no Motherland" and should be united 
in the common struggle against the common capitalist 
enemy. Similar to orthodox Marxists, these ideologists 
do not preach separation of Muslims along national 
lines. They argue that all Muslims should be united 
regardless of their ethnic origin, and that the power 
relationship in Russia should be changed so that Rus- 
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sian Muslims get a larger share. Here several models 
emerge. One implication is that Muslims should not be 
the "younger brother" of Russians but an equal partner. 
Another is that Muslims should be the leading group in 
Russia, the "older brother." Finally, there are those who 
believe that Russia should be totally Islamized. 
Muslims as Equal Brothers 
The model in which Muslims have moved from 
"younger brother" to equality with Russians has been 
elaborated on by Niazov Abdal-Wahed (Medvedev), the 
ethnic Russian who in 2001 created the "Eurasia Party." 
Niazov definitely regarded Russians as only equal to 
Muslims, and his political project called for a redistri- 
bution of power, so Russians would lose some of their 
power to Muslims. The implementation of Niazov's 
plan would lead to changes not only in Russia's power 
structure but also in its geopolitical arrangements. For 
Niazov the Muslim countries are the major allies, and 
it is not surprising that his party is funded by foreign 
Muslim sources. 
Muslims as Older Brothers 
Geydar (Geidar) Dzhemal, chairman of the Muslim 
Committee, has provided a new model in which Rus- 
sians are relegated to the position of "younger brother." 
In Dzhemal's view, the position of Russian Muslims 
is deeply connected with the global process, and the 
vision of this process is controversial enough. On the 
one hand, some of Dzhemal's schemes imply that Rus- 
sia is marginalized and that the global battle is going 
to be between Europe and the United States. Russia is 
to be just the object of global manipulation. 
Another scheme implies an active role for Russia 
in global affairs. This could be done only if Russian 
Muslims took the lead. Elaborating on this model, 
Dzhemal pointed out that Russian/Eurasian civiliza- 
tion has peculiar features. Dzhemal embraced, at least 
implicitly, the Slavophile notion about the "Russian 
idea"--the great messianic drive to create a global 
society of brotherhood. 
It was these features of the Russian/Eurasian civili- 
zation, Dzhemal argues, that led to the Bolshevik Revo- 
lution and the Soviet regime. This element constituted 
the core of Russian/Eurasian civilization for centuries, 
but it was destroyed by the cataclysmic changes that 
befell the country after Gorbachev's reforms. Western 
values of crass materialism are incompatible with 
wholesome Russian messianic collectivism, and the 
attempt to introduce them to Russia led to the collapse 
of Russian civilization. While Russian/Eurasian civi- 
lization is dying, Dzhemal implies, the centuries-old 
Russian civilization with its Russian idea--the quest 
for global justice that spurred the Bolshevik Revolu- 
tion with its global implications--does not die. It has 
just been picked up by the global Muslim community, 
and the present global jihadist movement is nothing 
but a manifestation of the worldwide revolution at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. Russian Muslims 
should play the leading role in this global jihad. And 
they should help the healthy elements in Russian 
society, including ethnic Russians, in this quest for 
global justice. 
Islamization of Russia 
This model of development evolved during the 
Chechen resistance. During almost 15 years of resis- 
tance against the Russian authorities--in fact, from 
long before the official eruption of the first Chechen 
War--Chechens have undergone serious changes. One 
was the transformation of what seems to be a consider- 
able part of the Chechen resistance from nationalists 
who fought for the independence of Chechnya into 
jihadists who regard resistance as a part of the drive 
for global Khalifah. This part of the Chechen resis- 
tance vehemently denies the notion of Chechens, or 
implicitly of any kind of nationalism of the Muslim 
people of Russia who dream about the creation of an 
independent/semi-independent state. 
They referred to the dreams, for example, of the Tatar 
elite, who plan not only to maintain Tatarstan's special 
position inside the Russian Federation but also to cre- 
ate a loose federation with Moscow or even complete 
separation. Moreover, those Tatar intellectuals also 
profess the theory of "Euro/Islam," which emphasizes 
that truly understood values of Islam do not contradict 
the values of the modem West. Thus, in the view of 
these intellectuals, independent Muslim Tatarstan could 
well be integrated into the European Commonwealth. 
In fact, they believe that Westernized Tatarstans-- 
truly imbued with European values of tolerance and 
democracy--would have more chance than Russians 
of acceptance as peers by Europeans. 
Those who follow jihadism have regarded this 
nationalistic trend as harmful, for it would lead to the 
re-creation of the morally/politically bankrupt societ- 
ies of the non-Muslim world. In the view ofjihadists, 
nothing can be salvaged from present-day Russia--here 
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jihadists are different from Dzhemal--for Russian 
civilization was rotten from the start. Russia can be 
transformed only if Russians are Islamized. This Is- 
lamization should be the path of all ethnic groups in 
Russia, in fact, of all people on the earth. 
All these models have implied direct or indirect 
redistribution of power in Russia and substantial if not 
radical changes in Russia's political arrangements. This 
could hardly please the Russian elite, mostly consisting 
of Russians or Russified members of Russia's minori- 
ties, e.g., Russian Jews. And, in order to understand 
the possible scenarios caused by the assertiveness of 
the Russian Muslim community, one should review the 
Russian, especially the elite, approach to the problems 
of the rising assertiveness of the Muslims in the Federa- 
tion and on the global scale. 
Eurasianism 
The Russian elite has de-
signed various models of the 
relationship between the Rus-
sian state, Russians in general, 
and the Muslim minorities of the 
empire for a long time, in reality 
since the beginning of modern 
Russian history. Those who as-
sume that Russia should follow 
the footsteps of the West looked 
at the Muslim minorities as most 
of European elite of that time 
looked at colonial peoples: their 
goal was to civilize them. West- 
Ethnic Russians, Orthodox 
by faith, belonged to the 
broad Christian civiliza-
t ionmbasical ly  equated 
with European civiliza-
tionmand had a civilizing 
Westernizing mission to-
ward Muslims of the empire 
who belonged to various 
ethnic groups. 
ernizers have always assumed that Russia was more 
backward than the European countries of the West. Still, 
Russia was much closer to European civilization than 
to any Asian countries. Ethnic Russians, Orthodox by 
faith, belonged to the broad Christian civilization--ba- 
sically equated with European civilization--and had a 
civilizing Westernizing mission toward Muslims of the 
empire who belonged to various ethnic groups. Here, 
the Russians' position was essentially the same as that 
of the French or British who engaged in "civilizing" 
and, in conjunction, Christianizing the "children," if 
one remembers Rudyard Kipling's definition of the 
subjects of Britain's colonial domain. 
Slavophiles, those who believed in idiosyncratic dif- 
ferences of the Russian (actually, Slavic) civilization 
from that of the West, assumed that Russians should 
treat the Muslim minorities in a benign way. In this 
respect, the Russian state was juxtaposed to exploitive 
European empires and regarded the Muslim minorities 
as the "children" of the grand Russian family state. 
Slavophilism had several modifications. One empha- 
sized the harshness and power of the Russian empire. 
As predominately a state of ethnic Russians, Orthodox 
in their faith, the state would harshly suppress rebel- 
lious minorities. The stress here was on awe and fear. 
A more liberal version of Slavophilism emphasized 
what Slavophiles call sobornost, a spiritualized sense 
of collectivity, which they assumed belongs to all Slavs, 
especially Orthodox Slavs. The notion of sobornost 
implied that Muslims could be converted to Orthodox 
Christianity, but it would take a long time, and any 
coercion should be excluded from the plan. At pres- 
ent, Muslim "children" of the 
empire should live unmolested 
under the benign rule of the 
Orthodox tsar--the little father 
of all his subjects. 
The emergence of the Soviet 
regime required new ideologi-
cal trappings of the political 
arrangements between ethnic 
Slavs--mostly Russians--and 
many non-Slavic minorities, 
quite a few of them histori-
cally Muslim. A new model 
of relationship between Rus-
sians and Muslim minorities 
was proposed by Eurasianism. 
Although emerging among the 
6migr~ community in the 1920s, Eurasianism in many 
ways ideologically institutionalized the relationships 
between the ethnic groups in the USSR and early So- 
viet foreign policy. Eurasianists proclaimed that it was 
not the Slavs outside the borders of Soviet Russia but 
various minorities, mostly Muslims of Turkic origin, 
that were the essential allies of Russia. Moreover, Eur- 
asianists proclaimed that although Orthodox Russians 
were the leading group in Russia/USSR/Eurasia, the 
ethnic minorities, mostly Turkic Muslims, could not 
be regarded as voiceless subjects of the Russian elite. 
From this perspective, Eurasianists were quite differ- 
ent from the Slavophiles of pre-revolutionary Russia. 
Slavophiles, even in their liberal version, the Muslim 
minority of the empire, were at best "children" whose 
views were not taken into account. For Eurasianists the 
situation was different. In the new arrangements inside 
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the USSR, Russians, while retaining the leading role, 
elevated Muslim minorities to the level of "younger 
brothers" who participated in the arrangements of the 
states, and whose ethnic and religious identity was 
confirmed. 
Eurasianists also proclaimed that, although Russia/ 
Eurasia was not Asia, its people had more in common 
with Asians rather than with Europeans. Eurasianism 
actually has been an informal voice for Soviet ideolo- 
gists in the sense that Eurasianists repeated what was 
proclaimed in the USSR, that the Soviet people were 
"a new historical unity" in which Russians played the 
role of major ethnic/cultural and political force. 
Even though Eurasianists actually vocalized the 
statements of Soviet ideologists, historical Eurasianism 
was not much known during the Soviet period, but in 
post-Soviet Russia it became quite a popular ideological 
trend. It provided an alternative to the soon discredited 
Westernism, especially in its American reading, which 
had dominated Russia's elite at the beginning of the 
post-Soviet era. Eurasianism provided the justification 
for the country's penchant for authoritarianism, for a 
corporate and, in many ways, criminalized economy, 
and--this was important--for Russia's existence as 
a multi-ethnic empire. While starting to spread among 
the post-Soviet elite at the beginning of Yeltsin's era or 
before, it became especially important during Putin's ten- 
ure. Putin has fully understood the importance of ethnic 
peace among Russians and non-Russian, mostly Muslim, 
people of various ethnic origins, and in his dealing with 
interethnic relationships he has in general followed the 
Eurasian paradigm, which emphasizes a healthy sym- 
biosis between Russian and Muslim minorities. 
Putin has demonstrated this unity between Russians 
and Muslims in various ways. For the 2006 state prize, 
Putin nominated both Patriarch Aleksei and a Tatar 
intellectual. In 2005, he was present at the millennial 
anniversary of Kazan, the capital of the Tatar republic. 
Putin pointed out that the city symbolized the mutu-
ally beneficial symbiosis of Russians and Tatars. Even 
historical events were interpreted in a Eurasian way. In 
2005, Russians commemorated the anniversary of the 
Battle of Kulikovo in 1380, which had been tradition- 
ally seen as the first battle in Russian history where 
Russians defeated Mongols/Tatars. The battle was seen 
as the first step in Russia's liberation from the Tatar 
yoke. Putin, however, provided a new interpretation 
of events. In Putin's view, it was a battle not between 
Russians and Tatars but between two political forces, 
each of which had both Tatars and Russians. Thus even 
the Kulikovo battle was an example of the cooperation 
between Russians and Tatars. 
The modern variation of Eurasiansm differs from tra- 
ditional Eurasiansm in its approach to Western Europe. 
Whereas in the 1920s-1930s Europe had been seen as 
alien/hostile to Russia/Eurasia, modern Eurasianists, 
for example, Alexander Dugin, the leading Russian 
Eurasianist, regard Western Europe, especially France 
and Germany, as natural allies, in fact, the natural 
extension of Russia/Eurasia. Still, despite this distanc- 
ing from Asia and a sort of positive view toward the 
European heartland, Eurasianism--not just traditional 
historical Eurasiansm but also its modern modifica- 
t ion-sees  in Asia one of the major points of gravitation 
of Russian foreign policy. Dugin, for example, regards 
Iran as one of Russia's foremost allies, the cornerstone 
on which a great Eurasian empire should be built to 
confront Russia/Eurasia's natural enemy: the United 
States. Putin's rather benevolent approach to Iran can 
be seen as the manifestation of latent Eurasianism in 
foreign policy. 
Eurasianism is thus the major ideological ingredi- 
ent of Putin's Russia and provides the ideological 
framework for coexistence between Russians and the 
Muslim, mostly Turkic, people of the Russian state. In 
fact, the latent Eurasianism here is a duplication of the 
Soviet notion of a "new historical community"--the 
Soviet people. In both cases, the role of Turkic/Muslim 
people in the ruling of the state was acknowledged; in 
all the paradigms, the Turkic/Muslim minority has not 
played the role of children of the Orthodox Russians. 
Yet they are relegated to the role of younger brothers 
vis-a-vis Russians. This arrangement started to be chal- 
lenged by an increasing number of Muslim intellectuals 
who felt the rising power of the Muslim community. 
And they forged a new version of Eurasianism in which 
Russia's leading role is challenged. Some of them, the 
radical Islamists, for example, reject not only the lead- 
ing role of ethnic Russians and their Orthodox faith, 
but the very existence of a Russian- and consequently 
Orthodox-centered civilization of Northern Eurasia. 
This sort of ideology and political design has found 
strong opposition on the part of Russian nationalists 
who increased their influence during Putin's tenure. 
Eurasianism to Russian Nationalism 
Russian-centered Eurasianism, with its implications 
of Russian symbiosis with the various Muslim peoples 
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of the Federation, has constituted the official, or at least 
semi-official, line of the Putin regime. This, however, is 
a rather weak ideological layer under which there is a 
much stronger streak of imperial Russian nationalism, 
apparently supported by a considerable part of the Rus- 
sian elite, including those who hold power. This can be 
seen by the fact that Russian nationalism can be found 
on Russian TV screens and radio waves--both outlets 
tightly controlled by the present regime. The rise of 
Russian imperial nationalism has solidified its posi- 
tion due to the changes in Putin's Russia. Upon Putin's 
ascent to power, the central authorities increased their 
power. By 2004, Putin had not only struck a serious 
blow against the political aspirations of the major "oli- 
garchs"--the tycoons who amassed enormous fortunes 
and wanted to rule Russia directly during the Yeltsin 
era--but  abolished the election of the governors. 
This increased centralization has coincided with the 
country's continuous economic growth, mostly caused 
by windfall oil and gas revenues. All these aspects of 
Putin's Russia are well known. 
There is another aspect of Putin's regime that has 
not received much attention. It is the continuous rise 
of the middle class and what Norbert Elias called the 
"civilizational process," as the behavior and modus 
operandi of increasing numbers of Russian middle-
class members become hardly different from those of 
Westerners. This process has affected the mentality of 
the Russian elite and a considerable part of the Rus- 
sian middle class and helped to shape Russian imperial 
nationalism. Those who have visited Russia recently, 
especially Moscow and St. Petersburg, could detect 
increasing elements of "normality" that have become 
not just a faqade--as in the early post-Soviet era--but, 
indeed, an essential aspect of life. While fraud and 
disrespect for the formal aspect of the laws continue 
to be widespread, they are not as pervasive as before, 
and formal, contractual obligations have started to be 
accepted by an increasing part of the Russian popula- 
tion. There is also much more respect for family, and 
prostitution has declined in popularity, in sharp contrast 
to the early post-Soviet period when it was one of the 
most desirable professions. The fact is that how Rus- 
sians dress and behave has become more and more 
similar to the West. 
One, of course, could argue as to the degree of these 
changes and their chance of continuation, as well as 
their overall importance and context. Still, they are 
here, and one could state that a modern Russia in the 
capitalist legalistic framework has started to slowly 
emerge, under the umbrella of the strong authoritarian 
state. One might remember that modern capitalism and 
the sense of citizenship also emerged in early modern 
Europe under the umbrella of strong government. One 
should also remember that the rise of capitalism and 
the sense of citizenship implied a rise of what could 
be seen as positive features: an increased sense of 
responsibility, not just to friends and kin--as in the 
Soviet era, which in many ways had features similar 
to pre-modern or non-Western societies--but also to 
the broader community and to the nation. 
At the same time, nationalism in nineteenth- and 
early twentieth-century Europe led to the development 
of racism. From the perspective of growing Russian 
nationalism, this also can be expected. In fact, racism is 
often the other side of the advent of capitalist modern- 
ization and the entrenchment of Western "normality." 
While discussing the development of Russian na-
tionalism, one should remember that modern Russian 
nationalism has its idiosyncratic features. Some of these 
hearken back to the early post-Soviet period. Most no- 
table is that this new Russian nationalism has absorbed 
the anti-Americanism of the "Red to Brown" opposition 
of that era. Anti-Americanism has become rampant. TV 
news regularly reports on American problems in Iraq, 
and it is implied that the United States has bogged down 
in Iraq. Mikhail Leont'ev, the popular TV political com- 
mentator, has presented the United States as a neurotic 
irrational power that plans to engage in a long series 
of wars to impose democracy in its American reading 
with no inkling of the consequences for the globe. It 
is not surprising, Leont'ev and other commentators 
imply, that the people of the world have started to arm 
themselves in order to protect themselves from the dan- 
gerous "cowboy" whose policies could lead to disaster 
for the world and ultimately for himself. 
While the United States is presented as pathologi-
cally aggressive, Russia is seen as a power that can 
stand for itself. This assertiveness is manifested, for 
example, in a sort of revival for Vladimir Zhirinovsky. 
Following his phenomenal success in the early 1990s 
when he captured almost 25 percent of the electoral 
votes in the Duma, after several scandalous statements 
and actions, he was seen as a spent force, a sort of court 
jester, and his book, in which he proposed re-creation 
of the grand Russian empire stretching to the Indian 
Ocean, was seen as one of the last shrieks of a dying 
Russian/Soviet imperial messianism. 
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Recently, Zhirinovsky, who proclaimed that Russia 
is a mighty state that could well defend itself from the 
United States, has enjoyed increasing support. The 
very fact that he has access to TV demonstrates that 
his views are shared by a considerable number of the 
ruling elite. This virulent anti-Americanism seems to 
have made this new Russian imperialism quite similar 
to the "Red to Brown" ideology of the Yeltsin era. But 
this is not the case. The reason is that this virulent anti- 
Americanism has combined with equally passionate 
philo-Europeanism. 
Dmitry Medvedev, one of Putin's deputies and, one 
assumes, a potential successor, has proclaimed publicly 
that Russia is a European power and any future Rus- 
sian president should remember it. Russian TV often 
blasts NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) but 
never elaborates on the European countries that are 
the members of the organization. As a matter of fact, 
Germany, France, and the UK, if mentioned on TV, are 
invariably presented positively. The prestige of Europe 
at the expense of the United States has been reinforced 
by the steady decline of the U.S. dollar versus both the 
Russian ruble and the Euro. But more than this, the pas- 
sion for Europe has been manifested by the daily life of 
Russians in the big cities. The goods in the stores, the 
advertisements in English and French, and always the 
appeal to the "European standard" indicate the passion- 
ate desire of the Russian elite and an increasing number 
of the Russian middle class to be a part of Europe, of the 
West in general, who should acknowledge that Russia, 
is just the eastern part of European civilization. 
Viewing Russia as basically a European power, these 
representatives of Russian imperial nationalism have 
no desire to regard Muslim minorities of  the empire 
as even younger brothers or share with them power in 
any way. In most cases, these Muslim minorities are 
benignly ignored. Images related to Orthodoxy are 
quite common on Russian TV, but images of Muslims 
and Islam are quite rare or seen in the framework of 
curious Orientalism. This was the case with Chechnya: 
on Russian TV Chechnya emerged as a peaceful place 
with a few insurgents who are nothing but foreign 
mercenaries. This generally peaceful Chechnya was 
populated by exotic people with boundless sexual drive, 
and this explains the spread of polygamy and the equal 
passion for martial arts. 
The imperial nationalists proclaimed that benign, 
mighty Russia--basically the state of ethnic Rus-
s ians-a l lows ethnic minorities, including Russian 
Muslims of various ethnic origins, to live in peace. 
But they should always remember their place. Russian 
nationalist-minded intellectuals state publicly that the 
government of the Russian Federation should remem- 
ber that its major concern should be not for abstract 
citizens of the Federation but for ethnic Russians. 
This sort of rebuke to the Federation government 
can be seen in response to Putin's plan to increase the 
birth rate to prevent continuous Russian depopula-
tion. One of the columnists of Izvestia has stated that 
Putin's plan is badly designed. The authors of the plan, 
he says, do not understand that the plan must target 
not Russia's citizens in general but ethnic Russians. 
Otherwise, Muslims and similar groups would take 
advantage of incentives and this would hardly benefit 
the Russian state. 
Not only Russian nationalists but even Eurasians 
who appreciate Muslim minorities much more than do 
nationalists cannot accept the idea of Russians sharing 
power with Muslim minorities on an equal footing. 
When Medvedev (Niazov) created his "Eurasian" Party, 
with the program emphasizing Russians sharing power 
with Muslim minorities, it led to an uproar among 
Dugin Eurasianists. Dugin vehemently protested the 
use of the word "Eurasia" in the title of the party and 
was quite hostile to Niazov's organization in general. 
There was, of course, a great deal of personal acrimony 
in Dugin's approach to Niazov's party, but, there is also 
a different cause for discord. For Dugin, Orthodox Rus- 
sia is to be the leading force in Russia/Eurasia, albeit 
he is not always consistent in his assumption (he has 
indicated that Eurasian Muslims, that is, the Muslims of 
the Federation, could well play a much more important 
role in the future). Niazov was convinced that power 
sharing should be implemented immediately and that 
Muslim countries of the Middle East should be Russia's 
major partners; Europe, including Germany and France, 
should be marginalized in geopolitical arrangements. 
This could not please Dugin-type Eurasianists or, even 
more, Russian nationalists who, regardless of politi- 
cal hues, see Russia as much closer to Europe than to 
any region of Asia. This basic European orientation of 
Russian imperial nationalism implied not only skepti- 
cal views of Muslims inside the Federation but also a 
rather cautious approach to the Muslim countries of 
what Russians call "distant abroad." 
This sort of cautious approach to the Muslim coun- 
tries can be seen in Russia's dealing with Iran. 
Not just "Eurasianists" but European-oriented Rus- 
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sian nationalists in general can easily find the benefit The story is different from that of extremist Rus- 
of dealing with Iran. Iran is not only one of the major sian nationalism. These ideological and consequently 
customers of Russian high technology, including political arrangements imply the following: (1) Russian 
weapons, but also vehemently anti-American; the lat- extremist nationalism implies the direct confrontation 
ter should, of course, please Russian nationalists with with ethnic minorities, especially Muslim; (2) the au-
their paranoid anti-Americanism. Still, in the minds thorities regard extremist nationalism as a direct threat 
of some Russians too close a relationship with Iran to the regime and the state. Despite the ideological 
could have quite a few negative repercussions. Such connection between imperial and extremist national- 
a relationship could not only suck Russia into direct ism, authorities regard the latter as the ideology of the 
confrontation with the United States--not in the plans opposition and a dangerous ideological trend that could 
of the Russian elite, regardless of all the vituperation potentially be detrimental to the very stability of the 
against the United States--but Russian Federation. 
also increase the assertiveness The rising extremist nation- As was the case with Slavo-of the Muslim minorities inside alism has a social framework 
Russia. And this hardly could philes of the late nineteenth quite different from that of 
please Russian nationalists. This imperial Russian nationalism. century, present-day Russian 
defines the nature of the Russian While some members of thenationalists proclaim thatelite's flirtation with Iran. This is Russian middle class solidified 
seen not as a sign of a possible minorities can live under the their position, other segments 
alliance, not as a goal in itself, of  society moved down theumbrella of the great Rus-
but plainly as a bargaining chip social ladder. The downtrodden 
in dealing with the West. There sian people, and while these and marginal elements have 
are positive mentions of Iran minorities, including Mus- a very weak sense of social 
on radio and TV, but they are solidarity and a class animus,lims, would not share power 
often intermingled with critical which fueled the European 
comments. Moreover, on one of with Orthodox Russians, they revolutions in the nineteenth 
Leont'ev's TV shows he blasted could exercise their cultural/ century and, to some extent, 
Bush as an irrational fanatic but the Russian revolutions ofreligious rights unmolested. 
made the same comments in re- 1905-1921. At the same time, 
gard to Ahmadinejad and stated they have many contacts with 
that if Iran proceeded in its extremist policy, it would the Muslim minorities who populate the local markets. 
lose Russia, its only true friend. It is not the rich as a social group but ethnic minorities 
Russian imperial nationalism emerged as the result who are seen as the major source of problems. It is 
of the solidification of the Russian states, economic clear that these groups of Russian extremists have put 
success, and the rise of the middle class. Its repre- forward the idea of "Russia for Russians." This vision 
sentatives have free rein to expose their views on TV. of the Russian state as a state of ethnic Russians is 
One can assume that it plays the role of a "reserve" implicitly directed against all minorities of the Rus- 
ideology--the ideological alternative if the current sian Federation, but it is the Muslim minorities of the 
European-oriented reading of Eurasianism were to fail. Federation that have become the major target of these 
Imperial Russian nationalism, while implying the use groups. 
of force in problems with ethnic minorities, including The political program of these groups in dealing 
those who profess Islam, still has room for compromise with Muslim minorities is as follows. These minorities 
with minorities. As was the case with Slavophiles of should be expelled from Russian cities, and, if pos- 
the late nineteenth century, present-day Russian na- sible, ethnic Russians should reassert their power in 
tionalists proclaim that minorities can live under the the ethnic enclaves. If this is impossible, Russia should 
umbrella of the great Russian people, and while these abandon these territories, for maintaining control would 
minorities, including Muslims, would not share power waste Russian resources and subsidize these enclaves. 
with Orthodox Russians, they could exercise their cul- In the context of this philosophy, an extreme option 
tural/religious rights unmolested. would be that Russians should opt for a "Republic of 
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Russia." This scenario would imply that Russia would 
shrink farther, possibly to the confines of the sixteenth 
century. But most important here in the view of these 
extremists is not the territorial range but the ethnic 
purity of the Russian state. Similar to imperial nation- 
alists, extremist nationalists are not anti-European or 
even anti-American. They regard Europeans and even 
Americans as fellow whites who should be united to 
fight the common threat. They are especially fond of 
European right-wing and neo-fascist groups and are 
willing to establish connections with them or, at least, 
take on their symbols. 
There are several groups that could fall into this cat- 
egory. The Movement Against Illegal Emigration is one 
of the most influential among them and actively partici- 
pated in the November 4, 2006 parade; "November 4" 
has replaced the celebration of the Bolshevik Revolu- 
tion on November 7. Another group, Russian National 
Unity (RNE), also seems to be experiencing a sort of 
rise in popularity, at least judging by numerous graffiti 
in support or against RNE, which I saw traveling from 
Ekaterinburg (Urals) to Moscow. There are also numer- 
ous skinhead groups. They are best known for pogroms 
against mostly dark-skinned minorities and foreigners. 
They also beat up dark-skinned foreign students and 
decorate the walls of Russian cities with graffiti. 
Repercussions 
Under the late Yeltsin, and now, especially Putin, 
Russia has experienced two different trends. On one 
hand, there is the increasing assertiveness of the Rus- 
sian state and middle class, who assume that ethnic 
Russia and Orthodox religion should dominate the 
Russian state. The emergence of various new forms of 
Russian imperial nationalism has led to a controversial, 
one might say, "psychotic," relationship with the West. 
While anxious to be accepted by the West, specifically 
Western Europe, Russians at the same time assert their 
importance and their hostility to NATO and the United 
States. At the same time, one can see increasing num- 
bers of Russian Muslims, mostly of Turkic origin, who 
are not so prone to assimilation as before and demand 
to share power with ethnic Russians. 
The Russian state has engaged in several programs 
to change the situation. One design implied bringing 
more ethnic Russians from the republics of the former 
USSR. Similar plans implied repopulating the Far East; 
here, of course, the plan was designed to confront real 
or imaginary Chinese ethnic expansion. Yet, with perva- 
sive corruption, the Russian state could hardly engage 
in the long run in policies that would change the ethnic 
balance of the state. Some of the recent measures--the 
attempt to boost the birth rate--would in fact increase 
the number of Muslims in Russia; in any case, there is 
a steady increase of Muslims in Russia. 
While the sameness of religion and ethnicity 
would not necessarily lead to a change of geopolitical 
emphasis, the Muslimization/Turkization of Russia 
could foster Russia's increasing gravitation to the 
Muslim region (e.g., Iran), especially if Russia were 
increasingly frustrated in its dealing with the West. 
This demographic and geopolitical shift would be the 
result of a process that would take a lot of time. There 
is, however, another problem, caused by the rise of 
the Russian extremists, which reinforces the rise of 
the militant jihadists in Chechnya and the Caucasus in 
general. It also has the potential to spread in other parts 
of Russia, like Tatarstan, that could be testified to by the 
wave of arrests of people accused of Islamic extremism. 
Besides encouraging Islamic extremism and terrorism, 
Russian extremism and direct violence against Muslim 
minorities can reinforce the separatist feelings among 
the regions dominated by Islamic people. This push 
for loosening the Russian Federation could be seen 
as a far-fetched scenario at a time when Putin has 
increased his power and the centralizing power of the 
state, and has prepared for the smooth transition of his 
successor. Yet in the case of a crisis/serious problem, 
the semi-disintegration/disintegration scenario would 
be a possibility. 
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